Elections between black and white candidates tend to involve close margins and high turnout. Using a novel dataset of municipal vote returns during the rise of black mayors in U.S. cities, this paper establishes new facts about turnout and competition in close interracial elections. In the South, but not the North, close black victories were more likely than close black losses, involved higher turnout than close black losses, and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by subsequent black victories. These results are consistent with a model in which the historical exclusion of Southern blacks from politics made them disproportionately sensitive to mobilization efforts by political elites, leading to a black candidate advantage in close elections. The results contribute to a growing body of evidence that the outcomes of reasonably close elections are not always random, which suggests that detailed knowledge of the electoral context is a precondition to regression discontinuity analyses based on vote shares.
Introduction
Economists and political scientists increasingly look to narrowly-decided elections for insights into electoral competition and the causal effects of election outcomes. Some see close elections and the incentives they create for elected officials as vital to representative democracy (McDonald and Samples 2006) . Others see them as valuable regression discontinuity designs that offer plausibly exogenous variation in election outcomes (Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004; Lee 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011) . Either point of view rests on the assumption that no candidate can systematically swing close elections.
However, a growing body of evidence on U.S. congressional elections suggests that candidates in positions of power can, in fact, manipulate the outcomes of relatively close elections.
Compared to losers of close congressional elections, winners tend to be affiliated with the incumbent's party, to be affiliated with the party in control of several state offices (governor, secretary of state, and state legislature), and to be better financed (Snyder 2005; Caughey and Sekhon 2010; Grimmer et al. 2011) . These findings are consistent with theories in which politically or economically advantaged candidates have disproportionate control over the outcomes of close elections, through either legal or illegal means. One set of theories emphasizes the ability of advantaged candidates to out-campaign their opponents or to intimidate their opponents' supporters in the lead-up to the election. Other theories involve ex post manipulation of election outcomes by advantaged candidates, either through litigation and demands for recounts or through outright fraud. Only in the second set of theories do advantaged candidates have precise control over elections decided by a handful of votes. But both ex ante and ex post actions can lead to non-randomness in the outcomes of elections with victory margins of only a few percent. This non-randomness may be of direct interest as a political phenomenon, but it also challenges regression discontinuity designs based on vote shares, at least those using feasible bandwitdths. Such analyses identify the effects of election outcomes (e.g., the election of a Democrat) by assuming that victory is randomly assigned in close elections (Lee 2008) .
This paper studies non-randomness and its implications in close elections between black and white mayoral candidates in the United States. The election of African-Americans to top municipal posts in the final three decades of the twentieth century represented a transformation of urban race relations in the U.S. Figure 1 exhibits the rise of black mayoral leadership over time in cities with 1960 populations greater than 50,000. As of 1960, no U.S. city had ever experienced a black mayor, but of the 100 most populous cities in that year, 38 would elect AfricanAmericans by the year 2000. Interracial elections during this transition were heated, typically involving high turnout and close margins. As such, the properties of close interracial contests can shed light on the electoral politics facilitating the rise of black mayors. Unlike typical congressional elections, however, candidates with connections to conventional sources of power
were not necessarily advantaged in close elections. Although white mayoral candidates enjoyed greater financial resources and power, black candidates had their own asset: a large unregistered, unincorporated electorate.
Nowhere was this truer than in the South, where African-Americans had been excluded from political life for much of the previous century. 1 Until the mid-twentieth century, poll taxes, literacy tests, and white supremacist organizations kept African-Americans from the ballot box.
Following the extension of the franchise during the Civil Rights Era, efforts to increase black voter registration and turnout were crucial to black electoral success in the South (Campbell and Feagin 1984, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) . Many whites were already accustomed to voting, whereas the South had a large, untapped pool of potential black voters. Voter mobilization also took place in the North, but black turnout did not depend as heavily on it. The low cost of raising black turnout in the South had much potential to systematically swing the outcomes of close elections. Because white voters voted for white candidates and black voters voted for black candidates, a citizen's (observable) turnout decision strongly predicted her (unobservable) ballot choice inside the voting booth. This observability made voting verifiable and thus made "manipulation" of the black vote share through strategic mobilization efforts more feasible.
Thus, the close-election advantage was ambiguous during the rise of the nation's black mayors. On the one hand, white candidates had more financial resources and more ties to traditional sources of power, especially in the South. On the other, black candidates may have faced lower mobilization costs, again especially in the South. In this paper, I study nonrandomness in the outcomes of competitive interracial elections using a new dataset consisting of the name, race, party affiliation, and vote return of each of the top-two candidates in over 1,000 U.S. mayoral elections. No existing data source contains this information for the sample frame of interest, which includes all elections during 1965-2000 in cities with a 1960 population of at least 50,000 and a 1960 black population share of at least 4 percent. I draw on a variety of historical sources to compile the dataset.
I use these data to document several facts about interracial elections. As motivation, it begins by showing that high turnout and closeness are important features of racial politics; in a specification with city and year fixed effects, a black candidate raises the number of votes cast and reduces the vote margin of victory. 2 After establishing these facts, the paper continues with the main empirical exercise, which estimates discontinuities in the density of the black vote margin of victory as well as several other outcomes. The results indicate that in the South, black candidates were disproportionately likely to win close elections. These close black victories involved higher voter turnout than the closest observed black losses, and they were over 70
percentage points more likely to be followed by black victory in subsequent elections. NonSouthern cities exhibited none of these patterns. 3 The North-South differences do not appear to be driven by regional differences in party politics. Data from neither region show evidence of sorting in close mayoral elections between a white Democrat and a white Republican. Furthermore, a large political party incumbency advantage existed in white-vs.-white contests in the North but not in the South.
The results on interracial elections in the South present a challenge to RD designs based on vote shares, but they by no means invalidate them as a rule. Rather, they send a basic message that detailed knowledge of the electoral context is an essential ingredient to careful analyses of election RD designs. Tests for discontinuities in the density of the running variable and other baseline covariates shed some light on the validity of the RD design, but the details of electoral 2 As discussed below, the turnout response to black candidates has been documented by Washington (2006) for U.S. congressional elections and by Lublin and Tate (1995) for a smaller sample of mayoral elections. 3 The estimates are large and statistically significant for the South; they are small and statistically insignificant for the North. However, the North-South differences in the estimates are not always statistically significant. competition provide a basis for theory, which motivates these tests and allows the researcher to judge whether their results make sense.
At face value, the results present a puzzle because the historical record reveals little evidence of fraud or post-election lawsuits that systematically favored black candidates. But in the discussion of the results, I outline a simple game of electoral competition that is consistent with the results. In the game, citizens always prefer their own-race candidate but vary in their propensities to vote. Both white and black political campaigns can mobilize voters to increase turnout, but they have access to different voter mobilization technologies. If black campaigns have a larger capacity to mobilize voters, then black candidates will win a disproportionate share of close elections, and-under the most likely class of distributional assumptions-close black victories will involve higher turnout than the closest black losses. This game also suggests several mechanisms through which mobilization asymmetries may increase the persistence of black victories, whereby a single victory precedes an era of black representation. Not all of these mechanisms involve the effects of incumbency; some persistence arises simply because candidates who push past a voter mobilization threshold to win have superior time-invariant characteristics. Thus, the mechanisms can explain why regression discontinuity estimates of the racial incumbency advantage are largest in elections that exhibit the strongest evidence of sorting around the victory threshold. Importantly, the game depends not on the level of electoral participation by a racial group but rather on its sensitivity to the actions of elites.
The paper adds to the literature on how threshold rules can induce endogenous sorting among agents. Relative to the existing literature on non-randomness in close congressional elections (Snyder 2005; Caughey and Sekhon 2010; Grimmer et al. 2011) , this paper has both weaknesses and contributions. The paper is limited by the relative scarcity of interracial elections, which necessitates the use of bandwidths larger than those used in the literature on congressional elections. But many existing election RD analyses use large bandwidths (or all of the data), making themselves susceptible to sorting of the type uncovered here. On a more constructive note, the paper differs from the literature on congressional elections in demostrating that a close election advantage does not always befall the candidate with greater political clout or economic resources. Black candidates in the South were disadvantaged in many respects, yet they won a disproportionate share of close elections, perhaps because the legacy of black political exclusion gave rise to an electorate highly responsive to mobilization efforts. In electoral contexts with well-defined groups of citizens who share preferences over candidates, voter mobilization may be a key margin for political competition. In this sense, this analysis of close elections contributes to a growing literature that draws attention to the electoral strategy of increasing turnout among supporters, rather than converting members of the opposition. 5 Non-randomness in competitive elections may threaten the validity of RD designs based on vote shares, but it is of considerable social scientific interest in its own right.
Interracial Elections Dataset
To study elections between black and white mayoral candidates, I collected data on the name, race, party affiliation, and vote return of each of the top-two candidates in urban mayoral elections between 1965 and 2000. 6 The sample universe includes all elections during this period in 5 On electoral competition among groups with common preferences, see Uhlaner (1989) ; Morton (1991); Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) ; Cox (2009); and Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2009 The Data Appendix lists the sources.
After collecting the basic election returns, I sought to identify each candidate's race.
Because this research concerns itself with voting patterns, I focus on the reporting of candidates' races by the newsmedia and advocacy organizations. The candidate race data come from a variety of sources, primarily the National Roster of Black Elected Officials, newspaper archives, and government and political websites. In many cases, photographs of the candidates were available, but photographs were rarely the sole information source on race.
This data collection effort resulted in a dataset of 1030 elections with racial identification of both candidates. 8 The elections include 318 black candidates and 1742 non-black candidates.
Because some of the 318 black candidates were either unopposed or some faced other black candidates, just 221 of the elections were interracial. Of these 221, 100 election returns derive from the Ferreira and Gyourko dataset, with the remaining 121 from my own data collection.
The coding of candidate race is in all cases original. 
Turnout and Closeness in Interracial Elections
To motivate the main empirical exercise, which focuses on close interracial elections, this section aims to set out basic facts about how the presence of opposite race candidates affects turnout and closeness in mayoral elections. An existing literature in economics and political science suggests that turnout soars during interracial elections. Washington (2006) estimates that both white and black turnout increase by 2-3 percentage points in Congressional elections with black candidates; Lublin and Tate (1995) find similar evidence in a small sample of mayoral elections.
The rise in turnout may result from an increase in voter interest when candidates differ in race, and this increased interest may in turn make elections more competetive. Table 2 uses a difference-in-difference specification to examine how voter turnout and the margin of victory change during black-vs.-white matchups:
where outcome ct is either the turnout rate or the margin of victory, interracial ct is an indicator for an interracial election, and allblack ct is an indicator for a black-vs.-black election. In the specification, c indexes city, and t indexes year, so that t and c are year and city fixed effects, respectively. The turnout rate is defined as the sum of the top-two candidates' vote receipts divided by the city's population (linearly interpolated between census years). The margin of victory is defined as the absolute value of the difference of the top-two candidates vote receipts, divided by their sum. The table only reports the coefficients on interracial ct ; the coefficients on allblack ct are too imprecisely estimated to be informative.
Turnout and closeness increase in interracial elections. As column (1) reveals, in both the North and the South, black-vs.-white matchups raise turnout by roughly 3.5 percentage points.
Because turnout rates are on average lower in the South than elsewhere in the country, this effect is proportionally larger in the South, where it is 16 percent of mean turnout. An examination of voter turnout by race would be interesting, but data by race are not available. 10 Column (2) shows that the margin of victory tends to decrease during black-vs.-white matchups. The coefficients for both the North and the South are negative, but only for the North and the pooled sample are they statistically significant. This difference may reflect the endogenous response of potential black candidates to (non-black) political machines in Northern cities. The supply of black candidates may have risen only when political machines were weak and expected vote margins were small. Regardless of this (imprecisely estimated) regional difference, at a broad level, the results suggest that interracial elections draw more voters and lead to closer margins than one would predict without information on the racial identities of the candidates.
Discontinuities in Interracial Elections
Interracial elections tend to be close, high-turnout affairs, but the relative performance of black and white candidates in these contests remains unstudied. This section assesses the extent of non-randomness in the outcomes of close interracial elections by analyzing how several variables change discontinuously at the vote threshold for black victory. I first focus on discontinuities in contemporaneous election outcomes, which violate standard assumptions for RD designs based on vote shares. I then estimate discontinuities in future outcomes, as is commonplace in RD analyses, and consider the relation of these ex post discontinuities to the ex ante discontinuities in the first part of the section.
Methods
I use two regression discontinuity techniques, both based on local linear estimation. Throughout, the running variable is the relative margin of victory between the top-two candidates when one candidate is black and the other non-black. I define the black vote margin as the black candidate's votes minus the white candidate's votes, divided by their sum. For analyses of contemporaneous turnout and future election outcomes, I use a standard local linear regression discontinuity estimator. To estimate discontinuities in the density of the running variable, I use the method developed by McCrary (2008) , which involves estimating a finely-gridded histogram and then using local linear regression to smooth the histogram, allowing for a discontinuity at the victory threshold. 11 McCrary's original estimand is the discontinuity in the logarithm of the density function, but to allow for consistent estimation when the density approaches zero near the victory threshold, I estimate the discontinuity in the level of the density.
Both estimation techniques can be summarized using the following specification, for city c in election year t:
where m ct is the black vote margin and f(•) is a flexible function of the black vote margin (approximated using local linear regression). The variable y ct is either an outcome (current turnout, future turnout, the probability of future black victory) or the density of the running variable. The
The coefficient β represents the discontinuous change in the conditional expectation of y ct when the black vote margin crosses zero. For the local linear regression analyses, standard errors are clustered at the city-decade level. 13 The density discontinuity standard errors are not clustered because analytic formulas for clustered standard errors do not exist; unreported bootstrap results suggest that the standard errors are not biased downward. 14 To mitigate small-sample bias in inference, I test hypotheses using critical values from a t-distribution with degrees of freedom set to the number of clusters minus two (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008) . 15 I present specifications with and without preelection covariates, including the lagged dependent variable. In graphical analyses, I use the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1 to enhance visual smoothness while allowing for flexibility in the regression function estimator.
Discontinuities in the Vote Margin Density
Figure 2 displays nonparametric density estimates of the black vote margin, allowing for a discontinuity at zero. The Southern data exhibit a stark drop in the density just below zero, suggesting precise manipulation of the running variable. The Northern data, while still showing a moderate increase in the density at zero, are nowhere near as stark.
Formal tests in Table 3 confirm this difference. At 1.83 (SE = 0.87), the discontinuity in the level of the density function of the South is larger and far more statistically significant than that of the Non-South, where the discontinuity is 0.85 and is smaller than its standard error. Narrow black losses were extremely rare in the South. Only one Southern election resulted in a black loss by a margin of less than 5 percent; each neighboring 5 percent bin has seven elections.
While this dip may be due to sampling error, the probability it occurred randomly is roughly 3.5 percent (the p-value from a two-tailed test). 16 A discontinuity in the black vote margin of victory is surprising in a democratic setting with a secret ballot. The fact that it favors African-Americans in the South makes the discontinuity even more unexpected, given the historical disempowerment of Southern blacks. In light of the moderately large bandwidth, the observed sorting around the black victory threshold in the South could be the result of either ex ante or ex post manipulation of the black vote share.
Discontinuities in Turnout
Patterns in voter turnout can shed some light on whether ex ante or ex post actions lead to the sorting of black and white candidates in close elections. If the density discontinuity is due to recounts or lawsuits, then the voter turnout rate should not differ substantially between close black victories and close black losses; these ex post actions primarily manipulate the distribution of a given number of votes. On the other hand, if ex ante black voter mobilization efforts play a role in the density discontinuity, then voter turnout will likely be higher in close black victories than in close black losses. Specific forms of electoral fraud-for example, ballot stuffing and caging (voter suppression)-may also lead to a discontinuity in turnout. But given the South's history of institutionalized discrimination against African-Americans, one would expect these tactics to favor white candidates rather than black. In that case, white candidates would win a disproportionate share of close elections, and close black losses would involve higher turnout than close black victories. 
Discontinuities in the Probability of Black Victory
The persistence of the turnout discontinuity in the South suggests that black prospects in future elections may rise following a pivotal victory. This result would have key implications for estimation of the incumbency advantage using RD methods. Lee (2008) Figure 4 graphs the probability of a black victory in the next election against the black vote margin in the current election. Panel A indicates that black electoral success is strongly persistent in Southern cities. After a black loss by a margin of 10 percent or less, a city has zero probability of electing a black mayor in the next election; after a black victory by a margin of 10 percent or less, the probability of electing a black mayor in the next election rises to well over 60 percent. This is not true outside the South (Panel B), where the data show only a minor discontinuity in the future prospects of black candidates. Table 5 estimates the magnitudes of these patterns. The setup follows that of Table 4 , with estimates for lagged black victory in column (1) and for future black victory in column (2). (The discontinuity in the probability of current black victory is 1 by construction.) Whether or not the regression controls for lagged black victory and other pre-election covariates, the Southern discontinuity in the probability of future black victory is statistically significant and large, over three-quarters. At the same time, the discontinuity in the probability of lagged black victory in the South is insignificantly negative. This result suggests a substantial change in a city's politics around the time of a close black victory. The extent to which this represents the causal effect of an African-American ascending to the mayor's office is unclear.
Interestingly, data from outside the South reveal no large discontinuities in the probability of past or future black victory. As in previous tables, Column (1) shows zero sorting on preelection outcomes. In column (2), the estimated discontinuities in the likelihood of future black victory are positive but small: less than 0.2 and smaller than their standard errors.
Bandwidth Sensitivity
Due to the small number of mayoral elections between black and white candidates, the preceding results are all based on fairly large bandwidths of 0.2. In both regions, the results are remarkably robust to bandwidth perturbations. The estimated discontinuities and associated t-statistics in the Non-South are consistently small, while those in the South are much larger. In the South, the t-statistics rarely fall below 2, and the point estimates are fairly constant across bandwidths, at least for the specifications that control for the lagged dependent variable. Figure 5 does have one unappealing feature: estimated discontinuities in the probability of future black victory that (counterfactually) exceed 1, often substantially. These estimates are due to the use of local linear regression, which admits predicted probabilities outside [0,1], on sparse data. However, these magnitudes are largely a feature of the unadjusted estimates, and the estimates are quite consistent for all bandwidths greater than 0.15. Certainly, all bandwidths lead to strongly significant discontinuities.
Are the Discontinuities Driven by Race or Party?
The preceding results suggest regional differences in racial politics, but they also allow another explanation. More than three-quarters of black candidates were Democrats, so perhaps the results reflect regional differences in party politics. To assess this alternative explanation, Table 6 examines elections between white Democrats and white Republicans, now using the Democratic vote margin of victory as the running variable. The analysis sample includes all such elections in the overall elections dataset (column [3] in Table 1 ).
If party politics account for the main results, then one would expect to find large discontinuities in the vote margin density, turnout, and the probability of future democratic victory in the South but not the North. In Table 6 , the data reveal no such pattern. Neither region exhibits a discontinuity in the two contemporaneous election outcomes the table considers: the vote margin density and the turnout rate. Moreover, the data indicate a large, statistically significant political party incumbency advantage in the North but not the South. The North-South difference in the political party incumbency advantage is exactly opposite the regional difference in black electoral persistence.
Apart from the possibility of confounding party and race, another ambiguity arises in the results over whether region is a proxy for demographic composition. Southern cities in the sample have larger black population shares than Non-Southern cities. As a result, the NorthSouth differences may be driven by political differences between cities with large and small black populations, rather than by a regional effect per se. Due to sample size constraints, subsample analyses of cities with large black population shares yield extremely imprecise results, so I do not report them here. However, results for cities with black population shares of at least 40 percent in the last population census are qualitatively similar to the main paper's findings, with large, positive discontinuities in the vote margin density, turnout, and black election prospects in the South but not the North. 17
Discussion
The analyses in Section 4 lay out several stark facts. In the South, close black victories were more likely than close black losses, involved higher turnout than close black losses, and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by high-turnout elections and black victories.
Data from cities outside the South display none of these patterns. Persuasion has received the most attention in models of electoral competition, but it was not the most important strategy in black mayoral campaigns.
Rather, historians and political scientists contend that voter mobilization by black political elites played an important role in black mayoral victories, as in other realms of racial politics.
Voter registration and canvassing efforts were an integral part of successful black campaigns. So too were calls to a collective black consciousness. In a well-known book, Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) argue: "It does not require any explicit group-based process of mobilization for upperstatus citizens to take a disproportionate role in political life.... Lower-status groups, in contrast, need a group-based process of political mobilization if they are to catch up to upper-status groups in terms of political activity" (p. 14). Supporting this point of view, Verba and Nie (1972) Murray and Vedlitz (1977), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) , and Leighly (2001) Although these efforts took place to some degree in Northern cities, they were especially important and intense in the South. The two decades following 1950 saw a revolution in voting rights. Figure 6 , highlights the magnitude of this extension of the franchise. In the top panel, which presents data on Southern black registration from the Voter Education Project, the number of registered African-Americans in the former Confederate states rose from roughly 150,000 Figure 6 uses data from the American National Elections Study to plot the ratio of the black voter registration rate to the white voter registration rate, inside and outside the South. 20 In the twenty years starting in 1952, the black reported registration rate in the South rose from one quarter of the white registration rate to parity. Blacks in the Non-South also saw a slight relative increase in reported voter registration, but this was nowhere near the magnitude of the racial convergence in the South.
Based on this regional difference in the importance of voter mobilization, Section 5.1
demonstrates how a simple game of electoral competition with voter mobilization can explain the paper's main findings. Section 5.2 then summarizes alternative explanations for the sorting of Southern candidates in close interracial elections, arguing that none of these alternatives fit the data as succesfully as the mobilization game.
A Voter Mobilization Game
In the game, the environment consists of two competing groups, i ∈ {b,w}, each of which fields one candidate. Citizens always prefer their own-group candidate but vary in their propensities to vote. Each candidate is endowed with a quality i , drawn from a continuous (group-specific) distribution. i is the fraction of group i citizens that turn out to vote for the candidate in the absence of mobilization efforts. The baseline margin of support for black candidates is therefore b b − w w , where i is the population share of group i. Candidates have access to a groupspecific mobilization technology Δ i , which increases the group i turnout rate by Δ i ( i ) at cost i ≥ 0. In the lead-up to the election, candidates alternate in (irreversibly) increasing i in multiples of , the smallest unit of money, until neither wishes to make further changes. 21 At that point, the election takes place, and the winner receives benefit from a term in office. Note that no candidate will invest more than in voter mobilization; higher investment always results in negative payoffs. Group i's mobilization capacity is therefore M i = Δ i ( � �), where ⌊ ⌋ is the largest integer that is weakly smaller than .
The subgame perfect equilibrium to this game depends on the difference between M w and This simple static game has two main predictions if black candidates hold an absolute mobilization advantage. First, as -the smallest amount of money-goes to zero, the density of the ex post black vote margin exhibits a positive discontinuity at zero. Second, the closest black victories involve mobilized electorates, whereas the closest black losses do not. If baseline turnout is positively correlated with the baseline closeness of an election, as is widely thought to be true (Cox and Munger 1989; Shachar and Nalebuff 1999) , mobilization leads to a discrete increase in voter turnout when the black vote margin crosses zero. 22 The game's lack of uncertainty is vital to these predictions. In the presence of bounded uncertainty over the baseline margin of black support, the discontinuity predictions would no longer be as sharp, but the 22 Turnout increases discretely between the closest observed loss and victory if E[2
. This condition holds if baseline turnout is positively correlated with baseline closeness or if black turnout varies against fixed white turnout.
partitioning of the state space would be similar, as would the overall implications for relatively close black victories and losses. Given the necessarily large bandwidths in the empirical work, the assumption of certainty provides a useful, parsimonious approximation with testable implications. In simulations of a similar game of party competition, Grimmer et al. (2010) demonstrate that RD analyses with vote margin bandwidths of less than 5 percent show sorting.
The one-period setup precludes analysis of dynamic phenomena, but the data suggest that sorting may contribute to the persistence of close black victories. To gain insights into dynamics, one could easily include multiple elections, with candidates maximizing the discounted sum of expected benefits. In such a model, each election pits the incumbent mayor against a new opponent from the other group. The winner then goes on to experience a random popularity shock while in office, and the sequence repeats. This alternative setup leads to similar equilibrium behavior but also sheds light on the dynamic effects of mobilization asymmetries.
Three potential mechanisms are especially natural for describing black mayoral persistence in this setting. The first arises mechanically because candidate types sort around the victory threshold. Because black candidates with baseline margins of support over a range of negative values still win, black incumbents who barely won in the last election will be shielded from small to moderate negative popularity shocks. 23 A second reason is the persistence of increases in voter registration (a stock). A third, due to Bobo and Gilliam (1990) , is that a black leader's victory raises African-Americans' sense of political efficacy, leading to greater black political participation. Thus emerges a self-reinforcing, virtuous cycle, with victory leading to greater participation, which in turn enhances the chance of future victory. Given the unfamiliarity of Southern blacks to the process of voting, this hypothesis is especially well suited for describing racial politics in the South. The historical exclusion of African-Americans from the voting process in the South lies at the heart of all three theories. The persistence of close black victories may also result from white learning about the quality of black executives (Hajnal 2001 (Hajnal , 2006 or white flight (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002) , although these explanations are less related to the mobilization of black voters.
Alterative Explanations
Compared to other potential mechanisms, the mobilization game provides a compelling explanation for the results. The fact that candidates from a disadvantaged group held an advantage in close elections is evidence against alternative explanations.
This fact implies, for example, that electoral fraud is unlikely to account for the results; most theories of electoral fraud predict cheating by those who hold power. The history of the pre-Civil Rights South is rife with examples of electoral fraud at the expense of AfricanAmericans, rather than in their favor (Kousser 1974 The main remaining alternative explanation is that the results reflect ex post legal actions, rather than ex ante mobilization. But the historical record does not suggest that black candidates were more likely than white candidates to request recounts (or mount lawsuits). Nor does it suggest that recounts (or lawsuits) systematically reversed election outcomes in favor of black candidates. Ex ante strategic behavior is therefore much more likely to be responsible for the observed non-randomness in close election outcomes.
Conclusions
Close interracial elections played a key role in the emergence of a black elite in municipal poli- 24 See, e.g., Biles (1992) , Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1990) , Colburn and Adler (2001) , and Hajnal (2006) .
tics. This paper documents several unexpected properties of these contests, which have implications both for our understanding of racial politics and for the reliability of regression discontinuity designs based on vote shares. In the South, where African-Americans were new to political participation, close black victories were substantially more likely than close black losses, they involved higher turnout than close black losses, and they were more likely to be followed by subsequent black victories. None of these patterns were evident outside the South,
where African-Americans, though historically persecuted, had access to the ballot and partici- 
Data Appendix
The elections data come from a variety of sources: (1) Ferreira and Gyourko's (2009) The sample includes all interracial elections with turnout data for the last, current, and next elections; it omits Augusta's 1998 election, which came after new borders dramatically increased the size of the city's population. The dependent variable is the residual from a regression of current turnout on lagged turnout. The smooth curves are local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 0.1. Open circles are local averages over 0.1-wide bins, with the size of the circle scaled to reflect the number of observations. Notes: Each graph plots the discontinuity estimates and associated t-statistics from a series of local linear regressions with bandwidths varying from 0.10 to 0.25. All regressions use the uniform kernel. The samples for the analyses of the vote margin density and the probability of future black victory include all interracial elections. For comparability, the samples for the turnout analyses only include elections with turnout data for the last, current, and future elections. Results are similar without this sample restriction. T-statistic 2 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Ratio of Black to White Registration South Non-South Notes: OLS estimates. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the city level. Each cell reports the coefficient on the interracial election indicator from a separate regression. The dependent variable in column (1) is the total votes received by the top-two candidates divided by the voting-age city population (interpolated between census years). The dependent variable in column (2) is the difference in votes between the top-two candidates divided by their sum. The sample omits Augusta's 1998 election, which came just after the city's consolidation with surrounding suburbs dramatically altered the size of the city's population. All specifications also include an indicator for black-vs.-black elections. † p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: Results represent the discontinuous change in the dependent variable when the black vote margin of victory crosses zero. Each entry corresponds to a separate local linear regression with a uniform kernel and a bandwidth of 0.2. See Figure 5 for bandwidth sensitivity checks. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the city-decade level. The dependent variable is the turnout rate, or the total votes received by the top-two candidates divided by the voting-age city population (interpolated between census years). Time t -1 refers to the last election, time t to the current election, and time t + 1 to the next election. The sample includes all interracial elections with turnout data for the last, current, and next elections; it omits Augusta's 1998 election, which came new borders dramatically increased the size of the city's population. The covariates include log population, percent black, percent under age 18, percent age 65 or older, and log median family income in the last census; the share of the county vote going to Kennedy in 1960; and indicators for the decade of the election. Significance tests are based on a t-distribution with degrees of freedom set to the number of clusters minus two: † p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figure 5 for bandwidth sensitivity checks. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the city-decade level. Time t -1 refers to the last election, and time t + 1 to the next election. The covariates include log population, percent black, percent under age 18, percent age 65 or older, and log median family income in the last census; the share of the county vote going to Kennedy in 1960; and indicators for the decade of the election. Significance tests are based on a t-distribution with degrees of freedom set to the number of clusters minus two: † p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figure 5 for bandwidth sensitivity checks. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the city-decade level. Time t refers to the current election, and time t + 1 to the next election. The sample includes all elections between a white Democrat and a white Republican in the overall elections dataset. Significance tests are based on a t-distribution with degrees of freedom set to the number of clusters minus two: † p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
